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INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to an employee’s possible expectation, state and federal labor 
protections afforded to United States citizens may be diminished if the employer 
sends him or her to a different jurisdiction to perform work. The federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”) requires a rate of one and one half pay for overtime work 
unless an enumerated exemption applies.1 Under the FLSA, employees lose 
protection if the employment is “in foreign countries and certain United States 
territories.”2 State wage and overtime laws modeled on the FLSA are less clear 
about foreign work exemptions similar to the FLSA and expand protections given 
to employees.3 
Analysis of the precedent surrounding this labor law issue and the historical 
context of the FLSA § 213(f) exemption are necessary to exploring whether 
overtime and minimum wage protections may be applied to work performed abroad 
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1 29 U.S.C. § 207(g)(3) (2006). 
2 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (2006). 
3 See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 333.105 (2010); Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 
1420 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the FLSA does not preempt more liberal California overtime laws 
from applying to maritime workers). 
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in the absence of a foreign work exemption. It is also crucial to consider the 
practical implications of this work exemption on the state employees and 
employers who live with these labor laws. 
In Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc.,4 the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania explored the significance of the absence of an 
explicit foreign work exemption in the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act 
(PMWA) after Mr. Truman asserted that the PMWA overtime and minimum wage 
protections should apply for work that he performed in England on behalf of his 
employer.5 In a motion for partial summary judgment, the defendant, DeWolff, 
requested the court find that the PMWA overtime provisions could not be applied 
abroad.6 The court denied the motion and found that the PMWA did not contain an 
implied foreign work exemption derived from the FLSA.7 This court’s decision 
serves as a basis for examining whether it is reasonable for a state to expand labor 
protections and reach farther than the FLSA in order to protect its citizens. 
Part I of this note explores the history and rationale behind the FLSA § 213(f) 
exemption; Part II covers the pre-emption policy of the FLSA; Part III discusses 
both different employment situations potentially implicating the foreign work 
exemption and the exceptions to the FLSA exemption that allow for coverage when 
an employee works abroad; Part IV begins the analysis of the PMWA and Truman; 
and finally, Part V discusses whether the § 213(f) exemption in FLSA should be 
applied in light of the policies surrounding the FLSA, state labor laws, and prior 
cases. This note does not call for the removal of 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) from the FLSA 
but focuses on the motivations behind it and its impact on a state’s—particularly 
Pennsylvania’s—ability to create laws protecting its citizens while working abroad. 
I. HISTORY AND THEORY BEHIND FOREIGN WORK 
EXEMPTION 
In Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, the Supreme Court examined whether the 
FLSA protections extended to employees of contractors who worked for the United 
States.8 These local employees worked on a United States military base, located in 
                                                          
 
4 No. Civ. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009). 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 Id. at *3. 
8 335 U.S. 377, 390 (1948). 
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Bermuda, that had been leased to the United States by Great Britain.9 The Supreme 
Court held that the FLSA protections did extend to the employees because the 
leased territory in which they worked qualified as a “possession” of the United 
States and therefore was under its control.10 The Court in Vermilya-Brown did not 
claim jurisdiction over United States citizens working abroad but rather over the 
military base territory, which led the Court to apply the FLSA.11 Vermilya-Brown 
does not set a precedent that jurisdiction is based on citizenship of the employee, 
but rather implies that jurisdiction is based on a specific geographical area and the 
events occurring in that area. Responding to the Vermilya-Brown decision, 
Congress codified a foreign work exemption in 29 U.S.C. § 213(f)12 by passing 
Public Law 85-231.13 In the foreign work exemption Congress restricted the FLSA 
in “its overseas application in certain overseas areas, and for other purposes.”14 
According to Senate Report No. 85-987, the Vermilya-Brown decision raised 
“difficult questions of sovereignty and offend[ed] the political sensitivities of the 
foreign governments.”15 The rationale in the Senate Report indicates a belief that 
workers had been paid satisfactorily, in proportion to local government 
requirements, and that to pay workers under the FLSA rates would incentivize 
workers to abandon local jobs and create a privileged group.16 Finally, the Senate 
found that application of the FLSA in the Vermilya-Brown context was problematic 
to the Senate because it exposed American contractors to liability, conflicting with 
the policy of the Department of Defense that contractors performing defense work 
                                                          
 
9 Id. at 380. 
10 Id. at 390. 
11 Bd. of Tr. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., Comment, Overseas Effect of Federal States, 1 STAN. 
L. REV. 768, 770 (1949). 
12 See Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 558–59 (7th Cir. 1985); Kimble v. Holmes & 
Narver Servs., Inc., No. 92-1904, 1993 WL 211650, *1 (4th Cir. June 17, 1993) (asking whether 
Vermilya-Brown “remains authoritative in light of subsequent amendments to the FLSA designed to 
reverse the decision”). 
13 Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 85–231, 71 Stat. 514 (1957) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 213(f) (2006)). 
14 Id. Originally, the act also listed Hawaii and Alaska as exempt areas, however in 1960 those two 
areas were removed. Pub. L. No. 86–624, 74 Stat. 411, 416–17 (1960). 
15 S. REP. NO. 85-987 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1756, 1757. 
16 Id. 
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on the Bermuda military base were insured against liability by an underwriting 
policy of the Department of Defense.17 
Since Vermilya-Brown, the Supreme Court has found that domestic United 
States legislation should be presumed not to apply extraterritorially unless 
Congress indicates otherwise.18 This presumption was considered necessary by the 
Court because of sensitivities to foreign affairs, feasibility of enforcement, and 
even fear of retaliatory conduct.19 
Despite the international and administrative concerns of applying the FLSA 
abroad, other FLSA exemptions are generally applied more conservatively since 
the statute is designed to prevent detrimental working conditions and protect people 
who are paid less generously.20 The purpose and policy of the FLSA are recited in 
§ 202(a)-(b): 
The Congress finds that the existence . . . of labor conditions detrimental to the 
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, 
and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and 
instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor 
conditions among the workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and 
the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of 
competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing 
                                                          
 
17 Id. at 1758 (“Such contractors could be liable for failure to pay overtime rates, underpayment of 
wages, plus an equal amount for liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and court costs. This possibility is 
a matter of great concern to the department of defense because it has underwritten its contractors against 
such a liability.”). 
18 See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (stating 
that absent contrary congressional intent, U.S. legislation is to apply only within U.S. jurisdiction); see 
also Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (finding that the Eight Hour Law did not apply to 
contracts in a foreign country). 
19 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nat’l de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19–21 (1963); Foley 
Bros., 336 U.S. at 296–300. 
20 See, e.g., Ensinger v. Urban, 332 A.2d 484, 488 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (“In applying the exemption 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the courts are required to give a narrow interpretation to the 
terms therein.”); Say v. Prior Oil Co., 43 A.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945) (stating that the 
purpose of the FLSA was to ensure fair pay to workers and that any humanitarian and remedial statutes 
must be narrowly construed so as not to frustrate the purpose and spirit of the statute itself); Jacob 
Wedemeyer, Of Policies, Procedures, and Packing Sheds: Agricultural Incidents of Employer Abuse of 
the H-2b Nonagricultural Guestworker Visa, 10 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 143, 173 (Fall 2006) 
(discussing attempts that were made to define agriculture narrowly in the context of the agricultural 
worker exemption in order to include more workers in FLSA’s protections). 
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commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the 
orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce.21 
A plain reading of the FLSA demonstrates economic concerns: the statute was 
enacted under the power of the Commerce Clause because Congress found that 
poor labor conditions would negatively impact the efficiency and national health of 
all workers, leading to interference with interstate commerce.22 However, the 
FLSA was enacted as a remedial statute in order to protect wage earners who did 
not have the ability to negotiate for reasonable wages due to lack of bargaining 
power.23 
II. THE FLSA POLICY ON PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW 
Congress defines the FLSA’s relation to other laws by determining the 
FLSA’s pre-emptive power. Provisions of the FLSA are not intended to “excuse 
noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a 
minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a 
maximum workweek lower than the maximum workweek established under this 
chapter.”24 This statement gives more-protective state and municipal laws the 
power to determine the controlling wage provisions. The FLSA functions as a 
floor, not a ceiling, for labor protections. Section 213(f) is given special attention in 
subsection (b), seemingly as a direct response to Vermilya-Brown, and applies only 
to members of the Armed Forces or a subclass of employees in the Canal Zone.25 
State laws cannot restrict protections afforded to employees under the FLSA, but 
states may offer greater protections to employees. 
Case law surrounding the FLSA further supports this reading.26 In DeKeyser 
v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., the Court recognized the FLSA savings clause and 
                                                          
 
21 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006). 
22 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981). 
23 See, e.g., De Leon-Granados v. Eller & Sons Trees, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1308 (N.D. Ga. 
2008); Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739 (stating that the FLSA’s purpose was to protect workers from 
underpayment and overwork). 
24 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
25 See 29 U.S.C. § 218(b) (2006). 
26 See Agsalud v. Pony Exp. Courier Corp. of Am., 833 F.2d 809, 810 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the 
federal Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. § 3103 et seq., that requires overtime pay after 60-hour work 
weeks does not pre-empt Hawaii state law from setting overtime payments for any time worked over 40 
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that state law “may offer an alternative legal basis for equal or more generous relief 
for the same alleged wrongs.”27 In DeKeyser, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the 
FLSA and the Wisconsin Administrative Code for defendant’s failure to pay 
overtime and the minimum wages owed under the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code.28 In Baxter v. M.J.B. Investors, the Court did not imply an FLSA exemption 
into the Oregon wage act and found that the FLSA-exempt plaintiff, working as a 
companion in adult foster care homes, was protected under Oregon law.29 The 
FLSA allows for expansion of rights by the states; FLSA exemptions are not 
automatically carried into state minimum wage laws.30 
Case law supports the position that employees will receive a higher minimum 
wage than otherwise given to them under the FLSA when the state provides for the 
higher wage.31 Moreover, the FLSA will not “override or nullify” state laws so 
long as the state laws do not “contravene” the FLSA.32 While this indicates that the 
most protective law will be the applicable one, the statement that state laws will be 
applicable providing that they do not “contravene the requirements” of the FLSA 
could be interpreted to mean that a basic requirement for applying minimum wage 
and overtime provisions is that the worker performs his or her job duties in the 
United States. However, it is equally plausible to consider that all citizens are 
eligible for labor law protections and that the provision at § 213(f) is an exemption 
indicating that working domestically is not as an initial requirement for eligibility 
for the minimum wage and overtime provisions. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
hours a week); Pettis Moving Co. v. Roberts, 784 F.2d 439, 441 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]his court will not 
convert a federal law that regulates safety into one that preempts states from exercising their traditional 
powers of economic regulation.”); Martinez-Hernandez v. Butterball, 578 F. Supp. 2d 816, 820 
(E.D.N.C. 2008) (“[T]he FLSA does not excuse an employer’s noncompliance with higher pay 
requirements than established by the FLSA.”); Cranford v. City of Slidell, 25 F. Supp. 2d 727, 729 (E.D. 
La. 1998) (holding that the municipality had to pay the police officers in accordance with Louisiana law, 
rather than the FLSA, because “Louisiana law was more generous than the FLSA”); Plouffe v. Farm & 
Ranch Equip. Co., 570 P.2d 1106, 1109–10 (Mont. 1977) (finding the FLSA exemption concerning the 
employee’s sale and repair of farm protection did not pre-empt the requirements of the Montana 
Minimum Wage and Hours Act). 
27 589 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1030–31 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
28 Id. at 1029. 
29 876 P.2d 331, 336–37 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
30 See, e.g., Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
31 29 C.F.R. § 778.5 (2010). 
32 Id. 
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III. EMPLOYMENT SITUATIONS OF DOMESTIC WORKERS 
ABROAD AND FLSA FOREIGN WORK COVERAGE 
In Truman, the plaintiff claimed he was a resident of Pennsylvania and 
worked at a domestic company but performed business abroad for over a week.33 
The Truman court looked to whether Mr. Truman was a “Pennsylvania-based 
employee” working abroad,34 indicating that there are two employment situations 
for Pennsylvania workers: those based within the state working abroad and those 
physically working within the State.35 
The FLSA at § 213(f) provides an exemption to employers located in a 
foreign country or jurisdiction of the United States from the FLSA provisions 
establishing minimum wage; overtime rates; certain investigations concerning 
wages, hours, and conditions; and child labor provisions that restrict employers 
from using oppressive child labor in production of goods.36 Although the broad 
language used in the FLSA appears to exclude all work performed in certain areas, 
there are exceptions to § 213(f). In Wirtz v. Healy, the Healys operated a tour 
company that offered tour packages with escorts who would accompany customers 
abroad.37 The escorts began and finished the tour in Chicago.38 The Court found 
that the escorts who performed services in both the United States and an FLSA-
exempt area during that same week were entitled to the FLSA benefits for both the 
work performed in the United States and abroad.39 However, when the escort spent 
the entire workweek in a foreign country, the § 213(f) exemption applied and, 
consequently, that worker was denied the FLSA protections.40 A United States 
citizen is exempt from the FLSA overtime and minimum wage protections once the 
                                                          
 
33 Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. Civ. 07-01702, 2009 WL 2015126, *1 (W.D. Pa. 
July 7, 2009). 
34 Id. at *3. 
35 See id. 
36 See 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (2006). 
37 227 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ill. 1964). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 129 (“Thus, when a tour escort of defendants spends part of a workweek with a tour in the 
United States, it makes no difference where the remainder of such work in that week is performed; the 
tour escort is entitled to the benefits of the Act for the entire week.”) (referencing both Vermilya-Brown 
Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948) and 20 C.F.R. § 776.6 n.20 (2010)). 
40 Id. at 129. 
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citizen passes the threshold of working a full week abroad; however, he or she 
receives the FLSA protections if the work in the exempt area is performed the same 
week as work completed domestically.41 
In De Leon-Granados v. Eller & Sons Trees, Inc., the plaintiffs, who were not 
United States citizens but physically worked within the United States, invoked the 
§ 213(f) exemption against a United States employer for unpaid visa expenses 
incurred in foreign jurisdictions, predominantly Guatemala.42 The U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia found that the § 213(f) exemption could 
not be invoked and recharacterized the situation as depending on the failure to 
reimburse the employees after their arrival to the United States, rather than the 
failure to pay for visas in foreign countries. This change of focus to reimbursement 
avoided extraterritorial application of FLSA.43 This decision leaves open the 
possibility that individual state labor laws could apply if a court could construe an 
event as somehow occurring within the state instead of abroad. Additionally, the 
§ 213(f) exemption may not apply to seapersons or to those who work on ships, 
even when the ship is located in an exempt area, because the § 213(f) exemption 
concerns geographical locations and not specifically employees on vessels; 
locations of vessels are fleeting.44 
Although United States citizens and state residents are generally unprotected 
under the FLSA when they work in an exempt geographical location, there are 
exceptions to this rule, as seen in cases like Wirtz45 and De Leon-Granados.46 Even 
if the § 213(f) exemption was hypothetically presumed to apply to state-level labor 
laws, state labor laws may still apply abroad through exceptions carved out of the 
§ 213(f) FLSA exemption. For example, a person working less than a week abroad 
may not only be protected under the FLSA but may also have protections under 
                                                          
 
41 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (2006). 
42 581 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1310–11 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
43 Id. 
44 See Kaluom v. Stolt Offshore, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 866, 880 (S.D. Tex. 2007); but see Cruz v. 
Chesapeake Shipping Inc., 738 F. Supp. 809, 822–23 (D. Del. 1990) (applying the FLSA § 213(f) 
exemption to seamen who participate in trips between two foreign countries in foreign waters). 
45 Wirtz v. Healy, 227 F. Supp. 123, 129 (N.D. Ill. 1964). 
46 De Leon-Granados, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 1310. 
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individual state laws.47 The foreign work exemption has not been interpreted to 
preclude federal or state protections in every situation that a person works while 
abroad. 
Extraterritorial application of United States employment law has been 
accepted in certain situations involving federal employment discrimination laws. 
Unlike the FLSA, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) applies to 
foreign corporations, provided that the corporations are controlled by firms located 
within the United States.48 Additionally, Congress enacted § 109 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, extending Title VII and the American Disabilities Act (ADA) to some 
U.S. citizens employed abroad,49 after the Supreme Court held that Title VII did 
not apply extraterritorially in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. 
Arabian American Oil Co.50 Finally, in Torrico v. International Business Machines 
Corp.,51 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York interpreted 
the ADA as capable of application abroad.52 
Both the ADEA and Title VII protections are extended if the American 
employer controls the workplace in the foreign country. Control is based on factors 
enumerated in the statute, including “(A) the interrelation of operations; (B) the 
common management; (C) the centralized control of labor relations; and (D) the 
common ownership or financial control, of the employer and the corporation.”53 
The ADEA restricts application “where the employer is a foreign person not 
controlled by an American employer.”54 Title VII only applies abroad when the 
                                                          
 
47 Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing a willingness to 
embrace this type of application when holding that interstate drivers regularly spending more than fifty 
percent of the week in the District of Columbia are protected under the District of Columbia Minimum 
Wage Act). 
48 Paul D. Snitzer, The Foreign Corporation in the United States: Here to do Business, to Discriminate, 
or to do Both?, 13 LAB. LAW. 445, 450 (1998). 
49 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 20003(f) (2006)). 
50 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
51 213 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
52 Id. 
53 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(3)(A-D) (2006). 
54 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) (2006). 
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employee is a United States citizen.55 Another exception to the application of the 
ADEA, ADA, and Title VII is that the employer will not be held liable if 
compliance with one of these federal laws would cause the employer to violate the 
relevant foreign law.56 Although the FLSA has an explicit exemption, other anti-
discrimination statutes in the employer-employee context do provide protections to 
citizens working abroad. The Torrico court compared the ADA, Title VII, and the 
FLSA and reasoned that while the ADA and Title VII apply to “employment in a 
foreign country,”57 the § 213(f) exemption in the FLSA exempts services 
“performed in a workplace within a foreign country,” and so the statutes were 
distinguishable.58 However, the Torrico court’s distinction relies on the specific 
language of the § 213(f) exemption. Since this language is not in all state laws, 
Torrico may not be persuasive in prohibiting application of state overtime and 
minimum wage laws abroad.59 
IV. PENNSYLVANIA OVERTIME AND THE FOREIGN WORK 
EXEMPTION AND THE FLSA 
The Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA) guarantees the same 
overtime rate that the FLSA provides, one and one half the regular salary for 
overtime after the maximum 40 hours are worked.60 Additionally, as with the 
FLSA, the exemptions to the PMWA protections are to be applied narrowly. In 
Davis v. Sulcowe, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the PMWA was 
originally enacted to offer protections to women and minors and thus “any section 
granting exemptions under the Act must be strictly construed against those 
claiming exemption.”61 Similar to the FLSA, the PMWA is a remedial statute, and 
it would frustrate the purpose of the PMWA to fail to consider inequitable 
                                                          
 
55 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2006). 
56 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(1) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(b) (2006); David A. Lowe, Enforcing the 
Employment Rights of American Workers Abroad, 24 LAB. LAW. 213, 214 (2008). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f) (2006). 
58 Torrico v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
59 See id. 
60 Compare 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 333.104(c) (2010), with 29 U.S.C. § 207(g)(3) (2006). 
61 205 A.2d 89, 90–91 (Pa. 1964). 
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bargaining power of the employees or to construe ambiguities against the public 
health.62 
Despite many similarities to the FLSA, the PMWA does not have an 
exemption for work performed in foreign territories.63 As a result of the absence of 
the foreign work exemption, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania held that the § 213(f) FLSA exemption should not be implied into the 
PMWA.64 In Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., the court denied a 
motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the defendant company had 
failed to show that Mr. Truman was an exempt employee under the PMWA, even 
though Mr. Truman was exempt from the FLSA protections for his work performed 
in England and Canada.65 Unlike the escort tour case, Wirtz v. Healy, in which the 
court found that the FLSA protections still applied when the worker split the work 
week between an exempt and non-exempt area,66 Mr. Truman spent entire weeks 
working in England and Canada.67 However, Mr. Truman was potentially based in 
Pennsylvania during the period he was working overtime in foreign countries,68 
Mr. Truman was potentially protected by Pennsylvania law, despite his physically 
working outside of Pennsylvania and DeWolff, Boberg & Associates being 
incorporated in Delaware.69 
The Truman court decided that the PMWA did not contain an implied 
exemption on foreign work despite the precedent that workers who spend a full 
week abroad are exempt from the FLSA protections during that period.70 The 
Truman court cited Friedrich v. U.S. Computer Systems, Inc., in which the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania construed the PMWA to extend to 
                                                          
 
62 Id. 
63 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 333.105 (2010); 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (2006). 
64 2009 WL 2015126, *1 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009). 
65 Id. 
66 227 F. Supp. 123, 129 (N.D. Ill. 1964). 
67 Truman, 2009 WL 2015126 at *1. 
68 Id. at *2. 
69 Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Truman, 2009 WL 2015126 
(W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (No. 07-1702), 2009 WL 5118923. 
70 Truman, 2009 WL 2015126 at *2; see also 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 333.105 (2010). 
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non-resident Pennsylvania employees working outside of Pennsylvania.71 Although 
Friedrich did not expand application of the PMWA on an international level,72 the 
Truman court used the persuasive value of Friedrich, the lack of an express 
exemption, and other case law to find the PMWA protection applied to 
Mr. Truman.73 The Truman court could have held that the exemption was implied 
from the FLSA, due to international sensitivities, or reasoned that the federal law 
directly contradicted Pennsylvania law. However, a plain reading of the PMWA 
and case law supporting the expansion of Pennsylvania labor law outside of the 
state led to the opposite conclusion.74 
The interplay between the FLSA and the PMWA is explained by the court’s 
statement in Friedrich v. U.S. Computer Systems, Inc.75 In Friedrich, the defendant 
argued that a prior definition of employee under the PMWA required that one was 
an employee only “to the extent that [she or] he is subject to” the FLSA.76 The 
defendant stressed that, despite the amendment to the definition of employee, the 
plaintiff was subject to the motorcar exemption under the FLSA and therefore the 
PMWA could not apply.77 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania disagreed, rejecting the defendant’s argument and reasoning that 
acceptance of that proposition would result in the PMWA ceasing to apply to all 
workers in interstate commerce.78 The court emphasized the underlying policy of 
the PMWA and stated that if the FLSA provided all of the protections that the 
Pennsylvania legislature could have offered its employees, there would have been 
no purpose to passing the PMWA.79 The Friedrich court went on to find that “[t]he 
Pennsylvania legislature enacted the PMWA to protect those employees who do 
                                                          
 
71 Civ. A. No. 90-1615, 1996 WL 32888 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
72 Id. at *5. 
73 Truman, 2009 WL 2015126 at *4. 
74 See Sanders v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 614 A.2d 320, 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“[I]t is well-settled 
that a court must construe the words of a statute according to their plain meaning.”); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. 
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not benefit from federal protection” and that the employees who were unprotected 
under FLSA were protected under state law.80 While the defendant company in 
Friedrich was based in Pennsylvania, the employee plaintiffs were not residents of 
Pennsylvania; nevertheless, the court considered them to be based in the 
Commonwealth for the purposes of the PMWA.81 
Similarly, a person falling outside the FLSA protections due to not working 
within the protected locations enumerated by § 213(f) is not “subject to” the FLSA 
in such a way as to remove all of the PMWA protections. As in Friedrich,82 the 
PMWA can provide protections to employees not covered under the FLSA. Policy 
and international concerns aside, to imply exemptions in the PMWA simply 
because they exist in the FLSA would reduce all protections that the Pennsylvania 
legislature deems necessary and vitiate state power.83 Federal law concerning wage 
and labor would become a ceiling, contrary to the purpose of the FLSA.84 Nothing 
in the plain text of the PMWA seems to contradict the result, and the FLSA has 
generally allowed states to expand, but not restrict, federally guaranteed 
protections.85 In that sense, Truman’s result is supported by and not contrary to 
federal law. 
Other factors support the Truman court’s decision. Although silence is not 
definitive, the definitions of “employee” and “employer” in the PMWA do not 
define employees or employers to only include those living in Pennsylvania.86 
Additionally, the section providing overtime exemptions does not mention work 
done abroad.87 
                                                          
 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at *8 (stating that a jury had found them to be based in Pennsylvania but also finding that the two 
employees did not reside in Pennsylvania). 
82 Id. at *5. 
83 See Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 2009 WL 2015126, *3 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009); 
Friedrich, 1996 WL 32888 at *5. 
84 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2006). 
85 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193 (2009) (affirming the Vermont Supreme Court’s 
holding that federal law does not create a ceiling for state law). 
86 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 333.103(g)-(h) (2010). 
87 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 333.105 (2010). 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  2 0 6  |  V O L U M E  7 3  ( 2 0 1 1 )   
 
The PMWA’s Declaration of Policy both supports and vitiates arguments set 
forth in Truman.88 The section implies that employees need additional protections 
because they have reduced bargaining power and that employers’ suppression of 
fair pay harms economic stability.89 This statement reinforces pro-employee 
sentiment and supports the idea that this title was set in place purely for the 
protection of employees and that their protections, being paramount, should not be 
unfairly restricted. However, the statute also states that “[t]he evils of unreasonable 
and unfair wages as they affect some employes [sic] employed in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . render imperative the exercise of the police 
power of the Commonwealth for the protection of industry and of the employes 
[sic] employed therein.”90 The need to protect employees and support the 
community is affirmed by this section, but the PMWA discusses employment 
within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, specifically referring to “employes 
[sic] employed therein.”91 One can be employed within Pennsylvania and still make 
trips for his or her employer to another country in order to do business, and the 
state of employment does not change. That the payment is coming out of a 
Pennsylvania company’s pocket and going into a resident’s is similarly unaltered. 
Moreover, unfair competition remains an issue if an employer can avoid overtime 
payments merely by sending its employees to areas with less-stringent overtime 
laws for business. 
An issue that arises in light of Truman is how to measure whether a person is 
a Pennsylvania-based employee or a resident of another state that might provide its 
own overriding labor protections. From May 22, 2006, until November 19, 2006, 
Truman worked in England, and for one week in January he worked in Canada.92 
DeWolff’s memorandum in support of the partial summary judgment motion 
implies that he worked domestically during the other months of his employment 
but does not specify where Truman was traveling to meet with clients or time spent 
in each area.93 Notably, memoranda for motions by the defendants concerning 
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summary judgment did not raise the issue of whether there was residency status or 
whether employment was based in Pennsylvania. 
The idea of a Pennsylvania-based employee is considered in Friedrich v. U.S. 
Computer Systems, in which the defendant argued that judgment should be entered 
against the plaintiffs because they were not based in Pennsylvania.94 Other states 
confronted with this issue may decide that application turns on citizenship of the 
state rather than whether the actual work takes place in that area.95 The court in 
Freidrich found that because of the failure to deny procedural defects in the case, 
including the failure to deny an affirmative defense, pre-trial memorandum, or 
proposed jury instructions, the plaintiffs were based in Pennsylvania; the defense 
had effectively waived the issue of where the employee was based.96 The plaintiffs 
were not state residents, but whether they were based in Pennsylvania was a jury 
finding to be supported by evidence presented by the plaintiffs.97 Freidrich stands 
for the precedent that employees based in Pennsylvania will receive protections 
regardless of residency, and that Commonwealth-“based” employment is a jury 
determination.98 The Truman court was not required to explore actual residency 
status or clearly define what constituted being based in Pennsylvania for 
employment purposes, as whether or not Truman was a Pennsylvania-based 
employee was a possible issue for the future jury to decide. 
V. SHOULD THE FOREIGN WORK EXEMPTION IN THE FLSA 
PRE-EMPT STATE MINIMUM WAGE LAWS? 
In Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw,99 the California Supreme 
Court explored the FLSA’s effect on the ability of the California Industrial Welfare 
Commission, a state agency, to formulate wage orders that were enforced by the 
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement in California. The Tidewater court dealt 
                                                          
 
94 Friedrich v. U.S. Computer Sys., Inc., No. 90-1615, 1996 WL 32888, *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1996). 
95 See, e.g., Parry v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc., No. 8:06-CV-00804-T-17TBM, 2006 WL 
2919018 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2006) (holding that Fla. Stat. § 760.01 applied extraterritorially to a woman 
who had been relocated by Outback Steakhouse of Florida to work in the Cayman Islands for over a 
year; she had retained her Florida driver’s license, was a registered Florida voter, and maintained motor 
vehicle registration in Florida). 
96 Friedrich, 1996 WL 32888 at *8. 
97 Id. 
98 See id. 
99 927 P.2d 296, 300 (Cal. 1996). 
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with whether the seapersons, who were outside of California State boundaries 
according to the federal definition of California boundaries, were subject to 
California law.100 The California Supreme Court found that California’s 
determination of the location of state boundaries controlled because the issue at 
stake involved California state law.101 In so deciding, the Court stated that, 
provided there was no direct conflict with acts of Congress, nothing precluded a 
state from “regulating conduct beyond its borders,” because California had an 
interest in the conduct of its citizens.102 
The Tidewater court found there was no actual conflict with the FLSA, 
despite seapersons being exempt from the FLSA minimum wage and overtime 
protections in section 213(b)(6).103 The Court found that the FLSA did not 
expressly restrict the power of the states to regulate overtime for seamen and the 
legislative history of the FLSA did “not suggest an implicit preclusion.”104 Instead, 
the legislative history indicated that Congress added this exemption for seapersons 
based on the requests of labor unions.105 
As in Tidewater, an important issue in Truman is whether Congress, in 
legislative history or expressly, has indicated an intention to restrict Pennsylvania 
from regulating the conduct of its citizens who work extraterritorially. Nothing in 
the FLSA explicitly restricts Pennsylvania’s right to offer extraterritorial 
protections to its residents under the PMWA or other state laws. Instead, the 
PMWA is in compliance with the FLSA due to the FLSA savings clause.106 There 
is no express provision in the statutory text of the FLSA specifying that the states 
cannot modify this exemption. 
The legislative history regarding § 213(f) is less clear. Legislative history 
demonstrates a focus on “native workers in overseas locations” instead of U.S. 
citizens107 and does not expressly show that Congress intended to restrict the states’ 
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power to create state equivalents to the FLSA that do not include the foreign work 
exemption.108 However, the Senate committee also expressed concerns that 
extension of the FLSA to overseas locations did not further the goals of the 
FLSA.109 Arguably, if a state law is closely modeled on the FLSA, the same 
assumption can apply: that extraterritorial application of the state law fails to serve 
the purposes for which the state law was enacted. Congress may have found it 
unnecessary to discuss the states’ powers regarding this exemption because of 
presumptions against extraterritorial application.110 
The FLSA exception that overtime and wage protections only apply 
extraterritorially if the worker spends less than a full workweek in a foreign 
jurisdiction is mirrored in case law. In a case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, the court held that bus drivers who spent more than 50% of 
their workweek in the District of Columbia were protected by the District of 
Columbia Minimum Wage Act.111 Arguably, it is consistent with the FLSA that the 
local state laws should not extend extraterritorially, whether within the United 
States or internationally, if the worker spends the entire workweek or more 
working outside of the particular state. However, the District of Columbia decision 
is not binding on Pennsylvania courts, even though the D.C. Act was similarly 
patterned on the FLSA.112 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit refused to import from the 
FLSA the exemption refusing protections to a particular class of workers from the 
FLSA and noted that residents of states have both the FLSA and expanded state 
protections.113 
The court in Williams v. W.M.A. Transit requested supplementary memoranda 
from the parties and cited from that memoranda information from the Maryland 
attorney general noting that FLSA exempt employees were covered by Maryland 
                                                          
 
108 See id. 
109 Id. 
110 See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (stating 
that absent contrary congressional intent, U.S. legislation is to apply only within U.S. jurisdiction); see 
also Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (finding that the Eight Hour Law did not apply to 
contracts in a foreign country). 
111 Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also 5 C.F.R. 
551.212(b) (employees who spend “all hours of work in a given work week” in an exempt area are 
FLSA exempt” (emphasis added)). 
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law, provided the Maryland Wage and Hour Law did not preclude coverage.114 
Even when the employment was exempt from the FLSA and subject to the 
jurisdiction of other federal agencies, the employment was still protected by the 
Maryland Wage and Hour Laws.115 The Court rejected the idea that an employee 
was not employed in the District of Columbia unless the employment was “entirely 
within the District of Columbia.”116 Instead, the court decided that being employed 
within the District of Columbia meant that the employee regularly spent 50% or 
more of his or her work time within the District. This definition also helped to 
preserve the overall purpose of the D.C. Act, which was to minimize negative 
economic impacts on other employers in the area who followed the D.C. Act.117 
In another District of Columbia case, the court looked at similar factors to 
those examined by the Tidewater court. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Massey, the D.C. Circuit listed three instances where the presumption against 
extraterritorial application did not apply: instances where Congress has clearly 
expressed the intention to extend the scope of the statute to conduct occurring in 
different nations, where failure to extend the scope of the statute to a foreign setting 
will result in adverse effects, and where the conduct regulated by the government 
occurred within the United States.118 Despite the FLSA savings clause, it does not 
seem that the lack of a foreign exemption falls into the first category mentioned in 
Masey. However, the second category, looking to adverse effects caused by failure 
to apply the law extraterritorially, could apply to the Truman situation and was also 
applied by the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California.119 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. involved the application of the Sherman Act, 
which is not applied to foreign trade unless the conduct involving the foreign trade 
has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on commerce 
domestically.120 In that case, despite arguments that application of American 
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antitrust laws would conflict with English law, the Supreme Court upheld 
application of the Sherman Act because of the effect on United States commerce.121 
The state level FLSA equivalents could affect state minimum wage and 
overtime protections available to domestic employees. If the employer could avoid 
all wage and overtime protections by basing the employee abroad for the entire 
workweek then the employer would gain an unfair advantage over other domestic 
employers within the state that did not move the workers to a FLSA exempt area. 
The resident employees who were forced to spend over a full workweek abroad 
would have different protection from workers who did not leave the state to 
complete their work. 
One court has stated that the purpose of the PMWA was intended to protect 
women and children who would be discriminated against and treated unfairly or 
others that had impaired bargaining power in the workplace.122 Both the ADEA and 
Title VII were also enacted to protect certain employees from being discriminated 
against based upon physical characteristics, age, sex, disability, or origin.123 These 
statutes do apply extraterritorially, depending on the level of employer control,124 
and have similar savings clauses to the FLSA.125 
The federal district court in Torrico v. International Business Machine 
Corporation held that the New York State Human Rights Law can be applied 
abroad even when the employee at issue is merely domiciled in New York and is 
not a citizen of the United States.126 The court invoked the exceptions from Massey 
that the presumption against extraterritoriality may not apply if the conduct 
occurred, or adverse effects would occur, within the United States.127 
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CONCLUSION 
Historically, the employer-employee relationship was regulated through state 
law.128 State law continues to play an important role in governing employment law 
in the absence of adequate federal law solutions to certain issues.129 The decision of 
whether to apply state minimum wage acts, without explicit foreign work 
exemptions, in other jurisdictions is influenced by the historical and modern 
importance of state law in regulating labor law, the FLSA savings clause, and the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.130 
If state law controlled overtime and minimum wage outside of the state, 
employers could face difficulty in keeping track of what laws apply to which 
employees. Classification of the employees may not even be clear, at this point. In 
Friedrich, it was not entirely clear what qualified as a Pennsylvania-based 
employee and whether that was the best standard.131 Employers would have to be 
provided with clear standards to determine if employees are state residents, whether 
employees are based within the state, and applicable state law if the employee is 
not based in Pennsylvania. Ambiguity in this area could encourage litigation during 
a time when employees may be bringing increasing numbers of wage and hour 
cases.132 
The Truman result is also not entirely beneficial to Pennsylvania employees. 
For instance, employers may try to avoid payment by contracting outside of the 
company or not even hiring the employee. However, that must be weighed against 
the strong risk that an employee could reasonably assume that if he or she is 
assigned to a project out of the state, the labor protections would not be lessened, 
since the employer prompted the traveling and the project. Finally, an employee 
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often lacks bargaining power, since the employer has the power to fire the 
employee and the employee generally lacks equal financial and legal resources. 
The Truman case also seems to be following an evolving pro-employee 
attitude and willingness to give coverage to those working abroad. For instance, in 
2009 a court refused to allow “a group of contractors working on a military base in 
Iraq” to recover damages, but then allowed a class action suit to be brought under 
California state law.133 
This article has not explored all of the concerns surrounding international 
sensitivities, or the concern that by applying state-law overtime protections in 
foreign countries, the authority for the United States to apply the FLSA and state 
laws to migrant workers in the United States is impaired. The FLSA and state laws 
are applied to migrant workers134 and, whether that is to reduce competition for 
local workers135 or for remedial and protective measures, it should be noted that 
domestic laws do alter the protections for workers who take employment within a 
FLSA territory. 
Although the Truman court’s decision is surprising in its reach, it is not 
without support from statutory and case law, it preserves the right for the states to 
protect its employee residents, and it can be altered by the Pennsylvania legislature. 
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